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Abstract. This study investigates the relationship between dimensions of judicial inde-
pendence and judicial review in constitutional courts Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union. In part a modified replication of prior works examining the issue, the 
study uses newly collected data from a panel of ten countries. It examines the relationship of 
judicial review with: (1) judicial independence (using both measures employed by the prior 
works, corrected versions of those measures, and measures original to this study); (2) political 
and social contextual factors; and (3) the receptiveness of post-communist countries to the 
importation of transplanted legal institutions. Improvements on the conceptualisation of 
judicial independence, inclusion of the dimensions of receptiveness, and a more appropriate 
panel of countries enable this study to present a more complete and accurate portrait of 
constitutional judicature in transition contexts. The results show that while corrections to prior 
measures of judicial independence improve the results at the margin, the entirely new measures 
of the concept represent a greater step forward. Several dimensions of judicial independence 
are positively related to judicial review, as are the measures of countries’ receptiveness to legal 
transplants. Other key factors positively related to judicial review in transition include 
legislative fragmentation at the time of each court decision, the scope of rights guarantees in a 
bill of rights, and popular trust in courts. Presidential power is negatively related to judicial 
review. The findings further indicate that aside from judicial independence, the prior works do 
present correct portrayals of most of the contextual influences they investigate.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The collapse of communist regimes in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) brought with it the dramatic transfor-
mation of entire systems of constitutional justice across Europe’s eastern 
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frontier.1 Many states where the rule of law had existed in name only for nearly 
half a century were suddenly freed to design and attempt to build (or import) 
new institutional frameworks for the administration of law and justice.2 Of the 
structural features designed and built in transitioning states, “by far the most 
important of the new institutions” were the new constitutional courts each 
country adopted.3 
 These new tribunals stand out for at least two reasons. First, while the 
process and products of transition differed in many ways across the region, the 
presence of a constitutional court was one of a few important commonalities. 
Although until 1989 only two countries throughout CEE possessed some 
(nominally) independent constitutional court, by the mid-1990s every state in 
the region had established one, most patterned after Germany’s Federal Consti-
tutional Court (FCC).4 This yielded a natural experiment of sorts: the same basic 
court model, transplanted into different contexts, produced noticeably different 
outcomes on a wide range of important issues.5 
  
 1 Schwartz, H.: The struggle for constitutional justice in post-communist Europe. Chicago, 
2000.; Procházka, R.: Mission accomplished: on founding constitutional adjudication in 
Central Europe. Budapest, 2002.; Přibáň, J.: Constitutional justice and retroactivity of laws 
in postcommunist Central Europe. In: Přibáň, J.–Roberts, P.–Young, J. (eds.): Systems of 
justice in transition: Central European experiences since 1989. Aldershot, 2003. 29–49. 
 2 Sadurski, W.: Postcommunist constitutional courts in search of political legitimacy. 
Florence, 2001. 8ff. 
 3 Dupré, C.: Importing the law in post-communist transitions: the Hungarian Consti-
tutional Court and the right to human dignity. Oxford, 2003. 26. 
 4 Sadurski: op. cit. 1; cf. Tanchev, G.: Constitutional safeguards of legality and 
legitimacy. In: Kelly, M. (ed.): Openness and transparency in governance: challenges and 
opportunities. Maastricht, 2000; Howard, A. E. D.: Judicial independence in post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe. In: Russell, P.–O’Brien, D. (eds.): Judicial independence in the 
age of democracy: critical perspectives from around the world. Charlottesville, VA 
2001. 89–110; Dupré: op. cit.; Schiemann, J.: Explaining Hungary's powerful constitutional 
court: a bargaining approach. European Journal of Sociology, 42 (2001) 357–390. Indeed, 
establishing a constitutional court became the distinguishing “trade mark” and the “proof of 
the democratic character” of post-communist states eager to demonstrate that a genuine trans-
formation to democracy was underway. Sólyom, L.: The role of constitutional courts in the 
transition to Democracy: with special reference to Hungary. International Sociology, 18 
(2003) 133, 134. Procházka insightfully emphasises the importance these states–especially 
the Visegrad Four (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland)–attached to being 
perceived in Western Europe as genuinely committed to transformation from authoritarian 
socialism to democracy. Procházka: op. cit. 
 5 This experiment has not gone unnoticed by students of courts as policy-shapers. 
Epstein, L.–Knight, J.–Shvetsova, O.: The role of constitutional courts in the establishment 
and maintenance of democratic systems of government. Law and Society Review, 35 (2001) 
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 Second, these courts played a very active part in shaping not just the out-
come, but the even the process of democratic transition,6 and many became 
formidable policy players in a very brief span of time. The Hungarian Cons-
titutional Court, for instance, struck down nearly one-third of all primary legis-
lation (273 of 905 national laws) brought before it for constitutional review 
during its first six years alone.7 The weight of the issues in which that Court 
played a pivotal role is striking: retroactive criminal legislation,8 restitution for 
expropriation by the communist regime,9 lustration laws,10 the IMF-directed 
economic austerity programme,11 abortion,12 the death penalty,13 same-sex 
partnerships,14 and many others.15 More recently, in July 2005, on the basis of 
a petition by thirteen citizens, the Slovakian Constitutional Court nullified the 
                                                      
117–164; Boulanger, C.: Beyond significant relationships, tolerance intervals and triadic 
dispute resolution: constructing a comparative theory of judicial review in post-communist 
societies. Paper presented at the Law and Society 2003 Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, 5–8 
June 2003; Scheppele, K. L.: Constitutional negotiations: political contexts of judicial 
activism in post-Soviet Europe. International Sociology, 18 (2003), 219–238. 
 6 Dupré: op. cit. 26. 
 7 Scheppele: op. cit. 224. This is particularly significant given the scope and range of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s exercise of its review powers in its first decade of 
operation. Nearly all of Hungary’s legislative framework was reviewed by the constitu-
tional court, largely as a consequence of the ease of access for petitioning review by the 
court. Sólyom, L.–Brunner, G.: Constitutional judiciary in a new democracy: the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000. 81. Specifically, via the actio popularis, any individual 
could petition for constitutional review of any law, regardless of whether she was in any 
way affected by the law itself; some 3,170 cases of this type were initiated between 1990 
and 1996, inclusive. Ibid. 
 8 See Decisions 11/1992 and 53/1993; available (in English) in Sólyom–Brunner: op. 
cit. For a fuller discussion of the retroactive punishment issue, see Nalepa, M.: Why post-
communists punish themselves: a model of transitional justice legislation. Paper presented 
to the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, IL, 27 April 2002; 
Nalepa, M.: Punish all perpetrators or protect the innocent?: a signaling model of truth 
revelation procedures. Paper presented to the American Political Science Association 
annual meeting, Philadelphia, PA, 28 August 2003. 
 9 Decisions 21/1990 and 16/1991. In: Sólyom–Brunner: op. cit. 
 10 Decision 60/1994. In: ibid. 
 11 Decision 43/1995. In: ibid. 
 12 Decision 64/1991. In: ibid. 
 13 Decision 23/1990. In: ibid. 
 14 See Decision 14/1995. In: ibid. 
 15 Ibid. 
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legislature’s ratification the EU Constitution and (temporarily) barred the 
country’s president from signing it.16  
 For students of judicial politics, the development of these new courts is 
significant not merely as an opportunity to apply existing models, but also 
because lessons from these unconventional contexts can improve and expand 
extant theories.17 The experiences, contexts, and compact histories of the new 
tribunals may prove pivotal in identifying gaps in existing theory; in particular, 
their study may bring to light forces which are invisible in ‘conventional’ 
contexts, but which ought to be incorporated into any general theory of consti-
tutional adjudication. 
 Explorations of the courts and the lessons they have to teach have been 
underway for well over a decade, but one of the discoveries thus far is puzzling. 
After surveying the judicial decisions of seven CEE constitutional courts, two 
prominent American political scientists–Eric Herron and Kirk Randazzo–
concluded that the degree of institutional judicial independence enjoyed by the 
courts did not affect the likelihood that those courts would annul a statute or 
other government act. This conclusion, along with several others reached by 
Herron and Randazzo and other scholars, runs counter to conventional 
wisdom, raising questions both about these new courts themselves and, more 
broadly, about broader theories of judicial independence. In short, if Herron 
and Randazzo are correct, then either (A) the new courts are sui generis, and 
have less in common with their Western templates, or (B) a basic tenet of 
political science–i.e., that institutional design affects behaviour–may not be 
true of constitutional courts. 
 Both the implications of Herron and Randazzo’s findings and problems with 
their and others’ studies make it necessary to revisit this question empirically. 
This Article does just that, seeking to uncover a more complete picture of CEE 
courts themselves and of judicial independence more generally. Building on 
the prior studies’ research design, the Article principally explores whether the 
degree of institutionally inscribed formal independence of the courts them-
selves affects the incidence of judicial review in CEE and the FSU. This study 
  
 16 Jurinová, M.: President ready to sign EU Constitution. The Slovak Spectator, 25 July 
2005. <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok.asp?cl=20421>. Forbes.com (2005): Slovak 
Constitutional Court blocks ratification of EU constitution. Forbes.com, 14 July 2005. 
<http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2005/07/14/afx2139424.html>  
 17 As Scheppele observes, the new courts “are good to study not because they are 
different in kind from what becomes normal politics, but precisely because they reveal 
in sharper relief the problems buried in what passes for normal in ‘consolidated’ democracies.” 
Scheppele: op. cit. 220. 
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also examines other factors that may influence the level of judicial review–some 
studied in previous work, and some original to this study. The study’s findings 
regarding the determinants of judicial review by constitutional courts in CEE 
and the FSU will contribute not only to an understanding of these courts, but 
they can also help to both test and reshape general theories of both constitu-
tional adjudication and the transplantation of legal institutions.  
 To this end, the Article proceeds as follows: Part 2 reviews existing 
literature addressing constitutional judicial politics in transition, describing and 
critique two particular investigations–Herron and Randazzo’s, and another by 
John Ishiyama and Shannon Ishiyama Smithey–that studied the relationship 
between judicial independence and judicial review in CEE and the FSU.18 
Part 3 describes the data and methodology employed in this study, and Part 4 
analyses the results. Part 5 offers conclusions regarding methodological 
improvements and substantive findings. 
 At the outset, it is important to note several obstacles that hinder all studies 
of the new courts. At a theoretical level, despite myriad volumes on judicial 
politics produced over the last two decades, a general theory of judicial 
independence–even a common definition–is still lacking.19 A novel, though 
elementary, model is developed and used here, but it goes only a short way 
towards constructing a sound, comprehensive definition of judicial independence. 
Second, the methodologies developed for studying constitutional politics in 
stable democracies with long traditions of constitutional review may be 
inadequate to investigate states where the courts are brand new, that have no 
recent tradition or legacy to build upon, and where the rules of the game are 
constantly in flux.20 This problem–troublesome enough when studying conven-
tional, consolidated democracies21–is heightened in transition contexts where 
the existence, content, and effectiveness of formal and informal rules of law are 
never known with certainty.  
 Finally, the transition context presents problems concerning the actual data 
needed for study. There is no standardised, transparent, and widely used 
  
 18 Smithey, S. I.–Ishyiama, J.: Judicial activism in post-communist politics. Law and 
Society Review 36 (2002) 719–741; Herron, E.–Randazzo, K.: The relationship between 
independence and judicial review in post-communist courts. Journal of Politics 65 (2003) 
422–438. 
 19 Russell, P.: Toward a general theory of judicial independence. In: Russell–O’Brien: 
op. cit. 1–24; Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 
 20 Boulanger: op. cit. 
 21 Stone Sweet, A.: A comment on Vanberg: rules, dispute resolution, and strategic 
behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998) 3, 327–338; Vanberg, G.: Reply to 
Stone Sweet. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998) 3, 339–346; Boulanger: op. cit. 
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database on court activity available, as there is for the world’s most-studied 
court.22 Moreover, lack of basic familiarity with the new courts makes it hard 
for scholars to know what data to collect. Add to these problems the tremendous 
language barriers,23 numerous inconsistencies between the courts in what 
documents and statistics are publicly available, and the fact that most in-depth 
research continues to come from single-country studies where the authors 
frequently are sitting or former jurists on the court they describe, and the 
challenges facing researchers of the new courts become quite daunting. 
 
 
2. Existing Literature on the new courts 
  
2.1. Methodologies and Findings of Prior Research 
 
The new constitutional courts of CEE and the FSU remain the most “under-
theorized” of any of the aspects of transition.24 Although they have received 
attention from around the world and from a variety of disciplines,25 much of 
this attention has been descriptive and exploratory in nature.26 Moreover, 
those studying the courts often bring with them established theories and models of 
judicial independence developed in other contexts,27 and thus comparatively 
little new theoretical ground has been broken.28  
  
 22 Prof. Harold Spaeth’s databases for the United States Supreme Court is “certainly the 
most important and influential”–as well as the most comprehensive and transparent–dataset 
available for the study of that Court. Epstein, L.–Knight, J.–Martin, A.: The political 
(science) context of judging. Louis University Law Journal, 47 (2003) 783, 807. 
 23 Schwartz, whose book on the new constitutional courts in CEE is perhaps the most 
frequently cited major work on the topic, acknowledges: “I do not, however, know the 
languages of the many countries covered in this book, I certainly am not very familiar with 
either their legal systems or national cultures, and I have translations of only some of the 
decisions and actions I discuss” (2000, xix). 
 24 Sadurski: op. cit. 
 25 Dupré: op. cit. 3–4. 
 26 Schwartz: op. cit.; Přibáň–Roberts–Young (eds.): op. cit.; Krygier, M.–Czarnota, A. 
(eds.): The rule of law after communism: problems and prospects in East-Central Europe. 
Aldershot, 1999. 55–76. Constitutional courts in the process of articulating constitutional 
rights in post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, Part I: social and economic 
rights. European University Institute Law Working Paper No. 2002/14. Florence, 2002; 
Harutyunyan, G.–Mavčič, A.: The constitutional review and its development in the modern 
world: a comparative analysis. Ljubljana, 1999. 
 27 Howard: op. cit. Burbank, S.–Friedman, B. (eds.): Judicial independence at the 
crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach. Thousand Oaks, California, 2002. 
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 This is surprising not only because of the ubiquity, activist tendencies, and 
importance of these courts to the transformation to democracy, but also because 
constitutional judicature in transition lies at the nexus of two rich fields of the 
political science and transition literatures. First, the theoretical and empirical 
literature on constitutional judicial politics has produced several methodologies 
and models for investigating established constitutional courts.29 Intertwined with 
these advances have been efforts, incomplete as yet, to uncover the nature, causes, 
and effects of judicial independence.30 Several applications of these theories and 
methods to transition contexts are discussed in the following section.  
 Second, the literature on the “transplantation”31 or “importation”32 of legal 
systems, and the explicit extensions of this line of investigation to post-
communist contexts,33 offers several critical insights pertinent to constitutional 
                                                      
 28 There are exceptions, of course. See Procházka: op. cit.; Scheppele, K. L.: Declarations 
of independence: judicial reactions to political pressure. In: Burbank–Friedman (eds.): op. 
cit. 227–280. 
 29 Shapiro, M.: Courts: a comparative and political analysis. Chicago, 1981; Stone 
Sweet, A.: Governing with judges: constitutional politics in Europe. Oxford, 2000; 
Vanberg, G.: The politics of constitutional review in Germany. Cambridge, 2005; Garrett, 
G.–Kelemen, R. D.–Schulz, H.: The European Court of Justice, national governments, and 
legal integration in the European Union. International Organization. 52 (1998) 149–176; 
Epstein, L.–Knight, J.: The choices justices make. Congressional Quarterly, Washington, 
1998; Epstein–Knight–Martin: op. cit. As Boulanger recounts, three major threads of have 
taken shape in the literature on courts and their role in governance: formalist (i.e. rational 
choice) models, “behavioural/empiricist accounts” employing several tools of statistical 
analysis, and the more abstract “triadic dispute resolution” models such as that elaborated 
by Stone Sweet. Boulanger: op. cit. 7ff. As scholars have begun to turn their attention 
toward CEE and FSU constitutional courts, they have made more use of the first two of 
these approaches, while the third has been partly subsumed in historical-contextual 
accounts, such as those of Procházka and Boulanger. 
 30 Russell–O’Brien: op. cit. Ackner, L.: The erosion of judicial independence. London, 
1997; Burbank–Friedman: op. cit. Lane, L.: Judicial independence and the increasing 
executive role in judicial administration. In: Shetreet, S.–Deschenes, J. (eds.): Judicial 
Independence: The Contemporary Debate. Dordrecht, 1985; Ramseyer, J. M.–Rasmusen, E.: 
Measuring judicial independence: the political economy of judging in Japan. Chicago, 2003. 
 31 Watson, A.: Legal transplants, 2nd ed. Athens, Georgia (USA), 1993; Watson, A.: 
From legal transplants to legal formants. American Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 43 (1995) 469.  
 32 Ajani, G.: By chance and prestige: legal transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe. 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, 43 (1995) 93–117. 
 33 Dupré: op. cit. Pistor, K.: The demand for constitutional law. Constitutional Political 
Economy, 13 (2002) 73–87; Hendley, K.: Rewriting the rules of the game in Russia: the 
neglected issue of the demand for law. East European Constitutional Review, 8 (1999). 
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jurisprudence in transition countries. Most importantly, such explorations have 
identified several strategic and contextual factors–including a transitioning 
state’s familiarity with and adaptation of the legal system transferred34–that 
can influence the successful transfer of legal norms and institutions from one 
state to another. When such factors are absent, the systems will not function as 
effectively as in their original context, a phenomenon that commentators call 
the “transplant effect.”35 
 Despite this intersection of disciplines and the possibilities it may hold for 
developing new theories of constitutional judicature, scholars have instead relied 
on two familiar methodologies: static rational choice models and statistical 
analysis of judicial decisions. Each offers distinct costs and benefits. Rational 
choice models are among most prevalent and provocative tools for modelling 
courts and other institutions in non-transition contexts.36 Because of the 
transition literature’s youth, however, only a few attempts to apply rational 
choice models to new constitutional courts have appeared. The best example is 
the work of Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova,37 in which the authors employ 
rational choice theory to predict the interaction of constitutional courts with 
legislative and executive branches.  
 Although rational choice does offer a window into the ‘black box’ of 
judicial decision making, allowing outsiders to understand political influences 
on the courts as strategic actors, models like Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova’s 
face serious limits. First, to the extent they can accurately reflect the strategic 
rubric of political decisions faced by courts in a given country, they are likely 
too closely tied to that country’s context to be of broader value. Second, as 
Alec Stone Sweet has observed,38 rational choice models are as yet unable to 
  
 34 Pistor, K.–Raiser, M.–Gelfer, S.: Law and finance in transition economies. Center for 
International Development Working Paper No. 49. Cambridge, MA 2000; Berkowitz, D.–
Pistor, K.–Richard, J. F.: The transplant effect. American Journal of Comparative Law, 51 
(2003) 163–204. 
 35 Berkowitz, D.–Pistor, K.–Richard, J. F.: Economic development, legality and the 
transplant effect. European Economic Review, 47 (2003) 165–195. 
 36 Ferejohn, J. A.–Weingast, B. R.: A positive theory of statutory interpretation. Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992) 263–279; Knight, J.: Law and rational 
choice. Paper (draft) presented at Politics and Rationality Lectures, Collective Choice 
Center, University of Maryland, 23 Feb 2001. <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/umccc/knight.pdf>; 
Vanberg, G.: Legislative-judicial relations: a game-theoretic approach to constitutional 
review. American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001) 346–361. 
 37 Epstein–Knight–Shvetsova: op. cit. 
 38 Stone Sweet: Comment… op. cit. 
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explain situations where the ‘rules of the game’ themselves are in flux, especially 
when such changes are the result of interaction among the players.39  
 Third, the stylized portraits of political interactions that rational choice models 
present often include unrealistic, misleadingly oversimplified assumptions 
that affect their conclusions significantly. For example, Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova ground their model in the assumption that courts do not have the 
final say in determining the outcome of a given constitutional controversy, and 
accordingly they hypothesise–and confirm empirically–that constitutional courts 
can only survive, let alone increase their position in the political order, if they 
issue decisions which all of the other branches find it too costly to contest. 
Because many of the new courts’ most important cases concern conflicts between 
other branches of government, however, the authors’ underlying assumption 
leads them astray. Their model excludes the possibility of a court deciding in 
favour of one branch of government, over and against another, and if necessary 
relying on the branch it supported to protect it from attacks. Yet the courts of 
Hungary40 and Poland41 did precisely this.42 
 The main alternative to formal rational choice models is statistical analysis, 
which Boulanger labels the “behavioural-empiricist” approach.43 Transition 
scholars have employed statistical modelling to study both the creation of 
constitutional courts in CEE and the FSU44 and the actual behaviour of the 
courts in deciding cases.45 Of the latter type, two studies deserve mention: 
using a same measure of judicial independence developed by Smithey and 
Ishiyama, both Smithey and Ishiyama themselves and Herron and Randazzo 
  
 39 The third analytical framework in the broader literature on courts–the ‘triadic dispute 
resolution’ model–sets out to solve precisely this problem. Shapiro: op. cit. Stone Sweet: 
op. cit.  
 40 Scheppele: op. cit. Schwartz: The struggle for constitutional justice… op. cit.; 
Halmai, G.: The Hungarian approach to constitutional review: the end of activism?: the 
first decade of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. In: Sadurski, W. (ed.): Constitutional 
justice, east and west: democratic legitimacy and constitutional courts in post-communist 
Europe in a comparative perspective. The Hague, 2002. 189–212. 
 41 Brzezinski, M.: The struggle for constitutionalism in Poland. London, 2000. 
 42 Additionally, the Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova model ignores the role of 
parties/coalitions within legislatures or cabinets, which ought not and need not be excluded 
from rational-choice-type models, as evidenced by Steunenberg, B.: Courts, cabinet and 
coalition parties: the politics of euthanasia in a parliamentary setting. British Journal of 
Political Science, 27 (1997) 551–571.  
 43 Boulanger: op. cit. 7. 
 44 Smithey, S. I.–Ishiyama, J.: Judicious choices: designing courts in post-communist 
politics. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33 (2000) 163–182. 
 45 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicial activism… op. cit. Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 
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examined what relationship, if any, existed between the level of judicial 
independence and the incidence of judicial review. Except for differences in 
time span examined,46 the studies are markedly similar. Both aimed to capture 
the influence of various country-level attributes on the level of judicial review, 
and both examined a cross-sectional pool of constitutional court decisions 
from similar panels of countries through logit or probit analysis.47  
 Both the Smithey-Ishiayama and Herron–Randazzo studies yielded similar 
but surprising results. First, though both studies hypothesised a positive relation-
ship between judicial independence and judicial review, the Herron–Randazzo 
study found no significant relationship, and Smithey and Ishiyama identified a 
significant negative relationship.48 Each study, however, highlighted several 
contextual factors–political, social, and even economic–that were strongly 
associated with judicial review. Smithey and Ishiyama found significant positive 
relationships between judicial review and the degree of legislative fragmen-
tation, the number of elected layers of government, and popular trust in the 
courts. Herron and Randazzo identified significant negative relationships between 
judicial review and change in the country’s GDP growth as well as the level of 
presidential power.49 At the level of individual decisions, Herron and Randazzo 
also found that cases where the president or an ordinary individual citizen was 
the appellant were more likely to result in judicial review, as were cases 
concerning economic issues. Consequently, each pair of authors concluded that 
these aspects of context, rather than judicial independence embedded in insti-
tutional design, must be the dominating factor in explaining the experience of 
constitutional courts in CEE and the FSU. 
  
 46 Smithey and Ishiyama studied only the first three years of each court’s operation, 
while Herron and Randazzo examined all available years.  
 47 Each includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia; 
to this common set of six, Smithey and Ishiyama add Latvia and Slovakia, and Herron and 
Randazzo add Slovenia. Smithey and Ishiyama employ logistic (logit) regression, while 
Herron and Randazzo employ probit; as the underlying dependent variable is nominal, 
however, logit appears a more appropriate specification, and is thus used here. See Pampel, 
F. C.: Logistic regression: a primer. Thousand Oaks, CA. 2000. 
 48 In addition, Smithey and Ishiyama observed, but did not test statistically, that judicial 
activism (defined as the frequency of judicial review) rose with judicial independence 
(measured by their judicial independence index scale) up to around 0.55 on the judicial–
approximately the mean and median of the countries in their sample as well as the sample 
utilised in their earlier work which first employed the index–and then judicial activism 
begins decreasing, thus presumably yielding a unimodal peak. This possibility is tested and 
verified in the replication study herein. 
 49 Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 
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2.2. Grounds for Scepticism 
 
As noted, the main conclusion of the Herron–Randazzo and Smith–Ishiyama 
studies is surprising. Both political theory and elementary intuition suggest 
that judicial independence, if defined meaningfully, should bear some positive 
relationship to courts’ exercise of their independence through judicial review.50 
Accordingly, if these two studies are correct, then either conventional theory 
does not apply to these new courts, or that theory itself is incomplete or 
misguided.  
 A closer look at the design and execution of both the Smithey–Ishiyama and 
Herron–Randazzo research, however, reveals that one should not take their 
conclusions at face value. Both studies exhibit two critical problems: the data 
and cases selected, and the conceptualisation of the independent variables. 
After reviewing these key deficiencies, the need to revisit the ground these 
authors covered will be clear. 
 
2.2.1. Data and Case Selection 
 
Three troubling attributes of the Herron–Randazzo and the Smithey–Ishiyama 
studies concerning data and case selection should immediately stand out to 
those familiar with the work of these courts. First, both studies exclude several 
of the most visible and most intensely investigated courts in the region. Each 
pair of authors excludes Hungary–which was at the time “perhaps the most 
activist constitutional court not only in the CEE but also in the world”51–as 
well as Poland, a court which began as one of the weakest in the region, but 
began a steady rise to power years before its authority was formally expanded 
in the 1997 Constitution.52  
  
 50 Ibid. 425. 
 51 Sadurski: Postcommunist… op. cit. 3; Osiatynski, W.: Rights in new constitutions 
of East Central Europe. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 26 (1994) 111, 151ff.; 
Brunner, G.: Development of a constitutional judiciary in Eastern Europe. Review of Central 
and East European Law, 18 (1992) 535, 539–540. See also Scheppele: op. cit. Schwartz: 
op. cit.; Sólyom: op. cit.; Procházka: op. cit.; Halmai: op. cit. 
 52 Brzezinski: op. cit. Schwartz: op. cit. The authors of both studies indicated (in 
response to queries) data availability as the grounds for excluding Hungary, Poland, and 
other countries, both pairs of researchers indicated that data availability was a concern. 
However, it would appear that such data limitations result from those authors’ decision to 
use decisions published on court websites as the source of their data, which is commented 
on below. Cases from Hungarian Court, however, were available in non-electronic form in 
Hungarian from the first case forward (in the Hungarian Official Gazette), began to be 
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 Second, both studies exclude or mischaracterize one of the most important 
areas of the courts’ activity: abstract review. The new constitutional courts in 
post-communist states, and especially those of CEE, were modelled not on 
Anglo-American templates, but rather imported their structure mostly from 
Western European constitutional courts, specifically Germany’s FCC.53 The 
abstract review competence–which enables courts to adjudicate the constitu-
tionality (or legality, for sub-statutory acts) outside of the context of a concrete 
dispute54–is absolutely central to courts’ activity and power,55 especially in 
transition countries.56 But the Herron–Randazzo study excludes cases involving 
the exercise of abstract review from their sample altogether,57 and the Smithey–
Ishiyama study implicitly conflates a priori review, which is abstract by nature, 
with a posteriori abstract review.58 This confusion–which was explicit in 
their earlier work59–makes it difficult to decipher how Smithey and Ishiyama 
conceptualise judicial review. 
                                                      
published in German from 1995 forward, Dupré: op. cit. 7, and are now available in print 
in a number of languages including English. 
 53 Tanchev: op. cit.; Sólyom–Brunner: op. cit.; Procházka: op. cit. The model adopted 
in CEE represents the third generation of Kelsenian constitutional courts, after the pattern 
designed by Hans Kelsen for Austria in 1920 and later imported into post-war Germany 
and Italy. Sólyom: op. cit. The new courts, importantly, are linked to the Kelsenian model 
both in that they imported much of their structure (and in some cases, substantive juris-
prudence–see Dupré: op. cit.) from Germany, and also through more direct ties to the 
original Kelsenian design. See Schwartz: op. cit. 270–271. n. 9. 
 54 There remains, surprisingly, non-trivial disagreement over the border between concrete 
and abstract review. E.g., Procházka: op. cit. 79–80. Procházka distinguishes his own view 
from that of Stone Sweet in regard to review by constitutional courts of lower court 
decisions, which Procházka believes can be seen as abstract but which Stone Sweet 
classifies as concrete only. 
 55 Stone Sweet: Governing… op. cit. 45ff. 
 56 Procházka: op. cit.; Sólyom: op. cit. 
 57 Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 429. Herron and Randazzo give some reasons for their 
exclusion of cases of what they term “abstract review”, but their description applies only to 
instances where legislators petition for review. The courts of CEE and the FSU do not limit 
this power to legislators, however, and thus their arguments, as stated, are unpersuasive. 
 58 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicial activism: op. cit. The difference between the two categories 
is actually quite important. For purpose of disambiguation, a priori review–or preventive 
norm control–enables the court to review statutes prior to either passage by the legislature, 
promulgation by the executive, or application. A posteriori review–or repressive norm 
control–can include both abstract and concrete review of statutes after they have been 
passed, promulgated, and brought to application. Schwartz: op. cit.; Sólyom–Brunner: op. 
cit.; Procházka: op. cit. 
 59 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicious choices… op. cit. 167–168. 
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 One final data concern relates to the actual source of the prior studies’ data. 
Both works used cases available from the websites of the respective courts, 
using a combination of original language publications and English translations.60 
Courts’ selectivity in publishing decisions on their websites means that both 
studies relied on non-representative samples.61 Although most of the new 
constitutional courts are required by law to publish their decisions in an official 
state publication, publishing any, let alone all, of those decisions on websites is 
neither required nor frequently practiced.62 
 Some degree of selectivity is unavoidable, of course, as many courts publish 
only their more important decisions even in print. The difficulty, however, lies 
in the differences between the courts’ procedures and standards for choosing 
cases for electronic publication. Whereas some courts offer electronic versions 
of every published decision (e.g., Slovakia), others offer only a selection of 
the most important cases (e.g., Hungary and the Czech Republic). Each country 
may employ different standards to choose which cases merit publication. 
Accordingly, the samples used by the Herron–Randazzo and Smithey–Ishiyama 
studies for country A may be more representative, while the sample taken from 
country B will reflect only the more important cases. Because of this selectivity 
differential, the prior studies may have distorted the actual practice of individual 
countries. 
 
2.2.2. Operationalising the Independent Variable 
  
Beyond data and case-selection concerns, both studies also suffer from a deficient 
conceptualisation of the key independent variable, judicial independence. As 
noted above, both Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and Ishiyama employ the 
“Smithey and Ishiyama Index” of judicial independence (“SII”) the latter pair 
developed in an earlier work.63 The SII is a scalar measure, ranging from 0 to 
1, with higher scores reflecting greater independence. It reflects the average of 
  
 60 Herron and Randazzo explicitly state this, Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 428, and–both 
pairs of authors confirmed this in response to queries by the author.  
 61 Herron and Randazzo do note that their study is limited only to published decisions, 
and thus generalizable only to the universe of published decisions, ibid.; however, it is 
their conflation of publishing of decisions with publishing electronically, and in some 
cases in an accessible language which creates the difficulty. 
 62 In Hungary, for instance, a total of 11 092 proceedings were initiated between 1990 
and 1996. Sólyom–Brunner: op. cit. 72. But the Court’s website currently lists only 3 837 
decisions or case descriptions in Hungarian, and fewer than 50 in English. 
 63 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicious choices… op. cit. 167–169. 
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six individual scores–each also ranging from 0 to 1–representing six purported 
aspects of judicial independence.64 
 There are several problems with the SII’s design and application in these 
prior studies, however. First, there is reason to doubt that it can measure a 
court’s judicial independence meaningfully. Its six components supposedly 
represent various (vaguely-defined) dimensions of judicial independence, but 
the metrics employed appear arbitrarily chosen.65 For instance, though Smithey 
and Ishiyama describe the SII as a measure of “judicial power,”66 only two of 
its six components relate to the competences of the courts, while the rest deal 
with elements of the judges’ protection from manipulation by other branches. 
Although both dimensions–powers and insularity–are conceptually important 
to judicial independence, the SII makes unstated and unjustified assumptions 
about the weight and interaction of these two dimensions. Accordingly, the 
SII does not reflect a well-grounded conception of the factors that comprise 
judicial independence, nor of the interactive relationships between those 
component factors.  
 Moreover, both studies rely on apparently erroneous SII values for the 
countries they study.67 Coding errors are apparent in measuring countries’ a 
priori review powers, judges’ relative term length, and number of parties 
involved in appointment of judges. Thus, even if the SII were a valid measure 
by construction, there are reasons to question results achieved using it.  
 This is not to say that the prior studies’ findings are necessarily incorrect–
only that their conclusion must be tested more rigorously through modified 
replication. Replication also presents the opportunity to incorporate additional 
independent variables–both to test alternative causal stories and to control for 
important factors not accounted for in the original studies. The remainder of 
this Article undertakes that task. 
 
 
  
 64 See Table 2 (and notes accompanying it) for original and corrected scores (corrections 
coded by the author) on each dimension of the index. See Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicious 
choices… op. cit. 167–169, for a detailed discussion of the construction and coding of the 
index. 
 65 Moreover, even if the balance of areas represented by the six components was 
appropriate, the particular measures used to reflect each of the six components are markedly 
deficient proxies for the dimensions they are used to represent.  
 66 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicial activism… op. cit. 731. 
 67 A full account of the errors described summarily here is provided in the notes to 
Table 2. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 
3.1.1. Hypotheses for Variables Studied in Prior Works 
 
The study undertaken here examines the effect on judicial review of judicial 
independence, legislative fragmentation,68 and several new variables not studied 
the in previous works (introduced to measure the ‘receptiveness’ of the transition 
countries to the new legal institutions69). Regarding judicial independence, both 
the Smithey–Ishiyama and Herron–Randazzo studies–drawing on substantial 
support from the literature–anticipated that judicial independence and/or power 
is positively related to the degree of judicial review, which both defined as the 
frequency of judicial review. This expectation is premised on the view that 
courts enjoying “greater guarantees of independence” are “freer to exercise their 
own will” without fear of censure or retribution by the other branches.70 The 
primary hypothesis for judicial independence is therefore:  
H1-A: Judicial independence is positively related to the frequency of judicial 
review (exercised by the constitutional court). 
Because the prior authors use the exact same measure (the SII) to capture both 
judicial independence and judicial power, and because the present work aims to 
disambiguate these concepts, a second formulation of the first hypothesis is: 
H1-B:  Judicial power is positively related to the frequency of judicial 
review (exercised by the constitutional court). 
Also, because the present investigation also seeks to improve on several aspects 
of the execution of the prior works, this hypothesised relationship between 
judicial independence and judicial review should become gradually more 
apparent with each marginal methodological improvement. 
 Regarding legislative fragmentation, the prior studies harboured diverging 
expectations. Herron and Randazzo, building on an argument advanced by 
Stone Sweet,71 argue that a more divided legislature is likely to pass laws that 
are “generally less contentious than those produced by one dominant party.”72 
  
 68 As both the expectations and findings of Smithey and Ishiyama and Herron and 
Randazzo diverged on this issue, a clear hypothesis is necessary. 
 69 The other variables included by Smithey and Ishiyama and Herron and Randazzo are 
likewise tested here for purposes of replication, but separate hypotheses are not offered for 
these. Expectations for each variable are presented in the following section. 
 70 Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 425. 
 71 Stone Sweet: Governing… op. cit. 54ff. 
 72 Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 427. 
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Legislation thus produced should be less prone to challenge, as presumably 
more parties were involved in its design and thus have less reason to petition 
for its nullification.  
 Although this argument is plausible, the literature more strongly supports the 
Smithey–Ishiyama study’s hypothesis that legislative fragmentation is positively 
associated with judicial review, which that study confirmed empirically. Less 
unified legislatures or governing coalitions invite challenges by the judiciary, 
which (the judiciary expects) the legislature or coalition will be unable to 
override.73 With this in mind, the primary hypothesis for legislative fragmentation 
follows Smithey and Ishiyama’s expectations and results: 
H2-A: Legislative fragmentation is positively related to the frequency of 
judicial review. 
The Herron–Randazzo view–that diverse participation may yield less contentious 
legislative output–should not be discarded entirely, however. Specifically, their 
expectation may be true of fragmentation within governing coalitions. Although 
overall fragmentation would not seem to guarantee that a party’s preferences 
are incorporated into the legislative programme, membership in the coalition 
might offer some assurance of this. Additionally, whereas overall fragmentation 
would serve to weaken the legislature’s ability to override a court which struck 
down the legislature’s bills (in that overriding a court may require, as it does in 
many transition countries, a super-majority vote), fragmentation within the 
coalition seems less likely to generate this weakness: despite its internal 
divisions, the members of a coalition would presumably be willing to defend 
the coalition’s policies against interference by the courts. Thus, a secondary 
hypothesis for legislative fragmentation is:  
H2-B: Legislative fragmentation within the governing coalition is negatively 
related to the frequency of judicial review. 
For the remainder of the variables included for purposes of replication, separate 
hypotheses are not necessary, as the original authors’ hypotheses and findings 
serve as the propositions to be verified or rejected.74  
  
 73 Vanberg: Legislative-judicial… op. cit.; Tate, C. N.–Vallinder, T. (eds.): The global 
expansion of judicial power. New York, 1995. 31ff.; Holland, K.: Judicial activism in 
comparative perspective. New York, 1991. 9ff. A possible exception pertinent to some 
transitioning states is noted by Procházka: op. cit. 117, who suggests that legislatures 
divided to the point of fragility might receive extra deference from a constitutional court 
concerned more with stability of the new state than with conformity of certain legal 
provisions with the constitution. 
 74 King, G.: Replication, replication. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (1995) 443–
499; Herrndon, P.: Replication, verification, secondary analysis, and data collection in 
political science. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (1995) 443–499. 
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3.1.2. Hypotheses for Variables Not Studied in Prior Works 
 
A few other hypotheses are needed, however, for several new independent 
variables that were not examined by the Smithey–Ishiyama or Herron–Randazzo 
works. These variables reflect aspects of the “demand for constitutional law,”75 
namely: familiarity with the imported legal traditions, adaptation of imported 
institutions, and political participation in the design of new institutions. These 
variables aim to capture the ‘receptiveness’ of each country to the ‘trans-
plantation’76 or ‘importation’77 of legal institutions, including constitutional 
adjudicatory systems.  
 According to Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer,78 transplants of law to ‘receptive’ 
countries are more successful than those to ‘unreceptive’ countries. In countries 
which are receptive to the institutions they import, the import/transplant will 
be successful, whereas in unreceptive countries the institutions grafted in are 
more likely to operate dysfunctionally, exhibiting what scholars have termed a 
legal “transplant effect.”79 Countries “without previous exposure to the modern 
formal legal order before the collapse of the socialist system” are termed “new 
transplants,” which are expected to function similarly to unreceptive trans-
plants.80  
 This may not be true, however, of constitutional systems transplanted into new 
contexts. A country with no exposure to a system of constitutional judicature 
might have a ‘clean slate,’ as compared to those which are distinguishably 
“unreceptive” for substantive reasons, and therefore the transplant may be more 
successful.81 Testing this requires a definition of ‘dysfunctionality,’ but what 
this means in the case of constitutional review is not clear from the transplant 
literature. One possibility is that ‘dysfunctional’ courts do not develop in the 
  
 75 Pistor: op. cit. 
 76 Watson: Legal transplants… op. cit. 
 77 Ajani: op. cit. Dupré: op. cit. Pistor: op. cit. 
 78 Pistor–Raiser–Gelfer: op. cit. 15ff. 
 79 Berkowitz–Pistor–Richard: Economic development… op. cit.; Berkowitz–Pistor– 
Richard: Transplant effect… op. cit.; Pistor: op. cit.; Dupré: op. cit.; Ajani: op. cit. Pistor, 
Raiser and Gelfer (and works which build on this framework) identify countries classed 
either as exhibiting adaptation or familiarity as receptive; intuition suggests altering this 
definition to limit it to those countries exhibiting both. 
 80 Pistor–Raiser–Gelfer: op. cit. 
 81 For example, in the case of Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal began operations 
several years prior to the formal transition to democracy, but this brief heritage proved all 
but fatal to the Tribunal as a potent political actor in its early years after transition. See 
Schwartz: op. cit. 264 n. 10. 
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spiral-shaped pattern characteristic of the judicialization-politicization cycle.82 
As this pattern is associated with continually (if subtly) increasing judicial 
power and purview, this study expects that judicial review will be positively 
associated with the aspects of the demand for law indicated above. Thus, the 
final hypotheses are as follows: 
 H3: The more a country adapts the legal institutions it imports, the higher 
the level of judicial review its constitutional court exercises. 
 H4: The greater a country’s familiarity institutions it imports, the higher 
the level of judicial review. 
 H5: Judicial review is higher in countries ‘receptive’ to legal transplants 
than those that are ‘unreceptive’. 
 H6: Judicial review is higher in countries which are ‘new transplants’ than 
those which are ‘unreceptive’. 
 H7: The greater the diversity of political participation in the decisions to 
design and/or import legal institutions at the beginning of transition, 
the higher the level of judicial review. 
This last hypothesis connects also to the principal-agent theories of courts. The 
more ‘principals’ engaged in designing a new constitutional court should mean 
(1) more legitimacy and support for the court,83 and (2) less unity among the 
principals, meaning (a) the court can become powerful by adjudicating 
disputes between principals, and/or (b) the principals may find it more costly 
to constrain the court. 
 
3.2. Variables and Data 
 
To test these hypotheses, the study examines decisions of constitutional courts 
of ten countries of CEE and the FSU: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.84 All 
available cases (n=915) from these ten countries where judicial review was 
requested by the petition or referral to the court are included, from the earliest 
(available) year of each court’s operation through the end of 2003. Table 1 
presents a comparison, by country, of the samples examined by Smithey and 
Ishiyama, Herron and Randazzo, and the modified replication study. 
 The sample includes decisions involving both abstract review (both a priori 
and a posteriori) of legal norms and concrete review. The source of the data is 
  
 82 Stone Sweet: Governing… op. cit. 
 83 Pistor: op. cit. 84. 
 84 This includes all but one of the countries (Latvia, excluded to avoid overrepresenting 
the Baltic region) examined by both Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and Ishiyama. 
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the CODICES Database published by the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe, which provides full-text decisions and case descriptions from 
constitutional courts around the world. The CODICES Database does not 
entirely remove the problem of selection bias, but it significantly reduces the 
problem of differential selection bias, as cases are selected according to a 
single set of standards by a central agent.  
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Judicial Review 
 
To replicate the prior works’ methods, both bivariate correlation analyses and 
logistic regression analysis (logit) are used here. For the logit analysis, which 
forms the main part of the study, the dependent variable is the likelihood of a 
constitutional court exercising its powers of judicial review. Following Herron–
Randazzo and Smithey–Ishiyama, cases were coded 1 if the courts declared 
unconstitutional or otherwise annulled a statute, explicit government action, 
substatutory legislation or regulation, a treaty, or other similar legal norms, and 
0 if the courts did not. 
 For the correlation analysis, following Smithey–Ishiyama, static, country-
level attributes are compared with an aggregate measure of judicial review’s 
frequency: the number of cases where courts did exercise review across all 
years divided by cases where it was petitioned (or otherwise empowered) to do 
so. Three measures of this were used: (1) the scores originally calculated by 
Smithey and Ishiyama covering the first three years of each court’s operation, 
(2) the same scores supplemented by third-party data on Hungary and Poland,85 
and (3) scores calculated from the replication dataset. In a second set of corre-
lations presented side-by-side with counterparts of the first set, each of these 
three measures of the dependent variable is adjusted to reflect disparate levels 
of accessibility of the courts in each country. 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
 
3.2.2.1 Judicial Independence: Power, Access, and Insularity 
The prior works operationalise judicial power in the form of the SII described 
above, a synthetic measure designed to encompass “both the extent to which 
the constitutional courts possess judicial review powers and the extent to 
which the constitution extends independence of action to the constitutional court 
or supreme court from other institutional actors.”86 The present study begins 
  
 85 Data from Scheppele: op. cit. and Brzezinski: op. cit. 
 86 Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicious choices… op. cit. 167. 
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with this measure judicial independence, testing both the prior authors’ values 
and corrected values (to fix arithmetical and coding errors in prior studies). 
Table 2A presents the Smithey and Ishiyama Index (SII) of judicial independence 
as originally calculated. Table 2B presents the SII when corrected for coding 
and calculation errors. 
 Additionally, Smithey and Ishiyama observe casually, without testing 
systematically or attempting to explain, that the level of judicial review generally 
rises with judicial independence up to 0.55, a point immediately between the 
mean (0.54) and median (0.56) and mode (0.56) of the original distribution of 
judicial independence scores,87 but that judicial review declines thereafter. This 
possibility of a central peak is tested by comparing the absolute value of the 
distance of a country’s SII score from this central ‘peak’ point (0.55) with its 
level of judicial review. If 0.55 is indeed at the apex of a curve, then the 
distance between a country’s score and the peak will be negatively correlated 
to judicial review. 
 The limits of the SII itself can only be pushed so far, however, before a 
wholly new measure is needed. At the very least, judicial independence and 
judicial power–nebulous concepts which the literature has failed to define88–
cannot be treated as coterminous. An improved measure of judicial independence 
must conceptually identify, separate, and thoughtfully recombine various 
dimensions of judicial independence, and should be designed from theoretical 
premises rather than an unbalanced, unrepresentative amalgamation of attributes 
of transition courts.89  
 The present study achieves this by identifying three separate conceptual 
components of judicial independence: Access, Power, and Insularity. ‘Access’ 
refers to the range of actors authorised to invoke the court’s jurisdiction and 
request judicial review. It is comprised of the average access score of four 
types of constitutional review cases, each weighted equally: a priori review, a 
posteriori abstract review, a posteriori concrete review, and unconstitutional 
omissions. The access score for each of these case types is determined by the 
number of categories of petitioner authorised to initiate a case of that type.  
  
 87 Ibid. 
 88 Burbank–Friedman: op. cit.; Shetreet–Deschenes: op. cit.  
 89 An alternative and/or supplement to designing such an index deductively is factor 
analysis, a data reduction method aimed to identify underlying forces in a range of inde-
pendent variables. However, when employed in the present case, no single component derived 
accounted for even a majority of variance, and the main components identified were not 
associated with groupings of independent variables which were intuitively meaningful. 
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 ‘Power’ refers to the range of the court’s substantive competences, reflecting 
the scope and depth of its judicial review authority. This measure is built in the 
same way as Access, constituted of four average power scores (reflecting the 
proportional number of powers within each of the four case types which the 
court possesses) which are also in turn averaged together.  
 Finally, the measure ‘Insularity’ reflects the degree to which constitutional 
courts are shielded from political attacks or censure for decisions unfavourable 
to other political actors. It results from the average of five component scores 
(each ranging from 0 to 1) reflecting different aspects of judges’ protection 
from political retribution: judges’ immunity from prosecution,90 the number of 
effective appointing actors (deflated by a factor of 4 to yield an index with limits 
at 0 and 1),91 the term length of the judges relative to a legislative session 
(likewise deflated by 4),92 the original SII component for removal,93 and the 
original SII component for who controls court procedure.94  
 Table 3a details the composition of the individual elements used to construct 
new indices of judicial independence; Table 3b lists the computations used to 
generate these indices. 
 These basic elements are tested both by themselves and in certain specific 
combinations to test interactive relationships. Thus, the measure Power * 
Insularity captures the interactive relationship expected between competences 
and protection from censure, testing the inference that competences on paper 
only empower the court to the degree that judges are shielded from retribution. 
Power * Access aims to adjust the measure of the court’s competences on 
paper to reflect the ease with which those competences are invoked (since even 
the court with the greatest competences on paper can achieve nothing if no 
case can be brought because of justiciability requirements such as litigants’ 
standing). Also, a “Composite” measure of courts’ power and accessibility is 
computed by averaging the products of a priori power and access, a posteriori 
abstract power and access, a posteriori concrete power and access, and omission 
power and access. This Composite measure was also incorporated in an 
interactive measure: Composite * Insularity.  
  
 90 Values: 0: Judges have no special immunity; 0.5: Judges can be removed only with 
legislature's consent; 1.0: Judges can be removed only with the Court's own consent. 
 91 = 1 / ∑ (ai
2), where ai is the proportion of control over Court appointments allotted to 
each actor i; same basic modification of Laakso–Taagepera (based on Herfindahl) formula 
for effective number of political parties. 
 92 = T / L, where T is the term length of a single judge in years and L is the length of a 
legislative session. 
 93 Values: Constitutional bar on removing judges = 1; Else 0. 
 94 Values: Court sets own procedures = 1; Else = 0. 
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 All the foregoing measures of dimensions of judicial independence have 
values ranging from 0 to 1 (1 reflecting greater independence). Each reflects 
one of the many possible elements of judicial independence. All of these 
elements, taken separately and when combined interactively, should relate 
positively to judicial review.  
 
3.2.2.2. Additional Replication Variables 
For all independent variables included for replication purposes, variable speci-
fications computation (when necessary) followed the formulae used by the 
original authors. Thus, following Herron-Randazzo, legislative fragmentation–
both at time of decision and in the first democratic election–was computed 
using the widely-used95 Laakso–Taagepera measure of effective political 
parties.96 Both of these variables should relate positively to judicial review. 
The number of parties within the governing coalition, however, should relate 
negatively to judicial review for reasons given above. 
 The measure of and data for presidential power incorporates twenty-seven 
distinct competences potentially possess by presidents, adjusted for cases where 
powers are shared or if the president is indirectly elected. This is expected to 
relate negatively to judicial review, in line with both the hypothesis and 
findings of Herron and Randazzo. 
 Both the Herron-Randazzo and Smithey-Ishiyama studies include a 
measure of rights guarantees in each country, both of which are tested here. 
Herron and Randazzo use each country’s “Civil Liberties” score from annual 
Freedom House surveys. As lower scores on this scale (which ranges from 1 to 
  
 95 The measure, incidentally just the inverse of the Herfindahl ownership dispersion 
index from the economics literature, is given by: EPP = 1 / ∑ (pi
2), where pi is the pro-
portion of seats allocated to each party i. The index was first presented by Laakso, M.–
Taagepera, R. (1979): ‘Effective’ number of parties: a measure with applications to West 
Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12, 3–27. It was later elaborated upon by Taagepera, 
R.–Shugart, M. (1989): Seats and votes: the effects and determinants of electoral systems. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. Despite numerous calls for modification some by its own 
creators, it remains the standard measure. Dumont, P.–Caulier, J.: The ‘effective number of 
relevant parties’: how voting power improves Laakso–Taagepera’s index. Centre de 
Recherche en Economie (CEREC), Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC Discussion 
Paper Series, Cahier #2003/7. Available online: <http://centres.fusl.ac.be/CEREC/ 
document/cahiers/cerec2003_7.pdf>. Taagepera, R.: Supplementing the effective number 
of parties. Electoral Studies, 18 (1999) 497–504. 
 96 Data for political parties’ proportions of seats came from the University of Essex 
Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe. 
All computations of effective political parties are original to the present author. 
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7) are associated with greater civil rights protection, a negative relationship is 
expected here, which Herron and Randazzo expected but were unable to find. 
Smithey and Ishiyama generate their own index reflecting the scope of rights 
guaranteed in each country’s bill of rights, which they expected but did not 
find to be positively related to judicial review.   
 Smithey and Ishiyama’s measure of popular trust in the courts is also 
included here. Higher values of public confidence in courts should correspond 
to higher incidence of judicial review, an expectation which Smithey and 
Ishiyama confirmed. Additionally, the degree of federalism in each country–
manifested in the number of elected subnational tiers of government–was also 
included in the Smithey and Ishiyama models and thus in the replication. The 
hypothesis, which Smithey and Ishiyama’s data supported, is that greater 
divisions of power between the centre and regions should result in higher 
judicial review frequency.97 
 The final replication variable is the identity of the petitioner requesting the 
court to exercise judicial review. Following Herron and Randazzo, dummy 
variables for individual citizen petitioners and the president as petitioner are 
included. In addition, this study includes dummies for legislators as well as 
administrative or cabinet officials (e.g. ministers, ombudsman, etc.) as peti-
tioners.98 Each of these dummy variables should relate positively to judicial 
review, following Herron and Randazzo’s hypotheses and findings.99  
 
3.2.2.3. New Independent Variables 
Aside from legislative fragmentation in the first democratic election, variable 
specifications and data for measures of countries’ receptiveness to legal trans-
plantation are taken from Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer100 and Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard.101 Both sets of authors present the same coding scheme, used with 
modifications here, which identifies countries as possessing ‘Familiarity’, 
‘Adaptation’, both, or neither. Those “without previous exposure to the modern 
formal legal order before the collapse of the socialist system” are coded as “new 
transplants.”102 In the present study, the presence of Familiarity, Adaptation, or 
  
 97 Smithey and Ishiyama cite the World Bank’s annual World Development Report as 
their source, though there are discrepancies between the edition they cite and the numbers 
they report. In these cases, the original World Bank numbers are preferred.  
 98 Herron and Randazzo identify cases where the legislature is the respondent, not 
the petitioner. 
 99 Herron and Randazzo: op. cit., 431. 
 100 Pistor–Raiser–Gelfer: op. cit. 
 101 Berkowitz–Pistor–Richard: Economic development… op. cit. 
 102 Pistor–Raiser–Gelfer: op. cit.15. 
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both, as well as being coded as “new transplants,” should relate positively to 
judicial review. 
 
3.2.2.4. Control Variables 
Both as a possible explanatory independent variable and as a necessary macro-
level control, Herron and Randazzo incorporate the annual change in GDP growth 
in their model. They suggest several reasons why such economic conditions 
may lead to either higher or lower levels of judicial review,103 none of which are 
compelling, but their findings are uniformly negative and statistically significant. 
The present study thus incorporates change in GDP growth as well (base year = 
1990), expecting negative results in line with Herron and Randazzo’s finding.  
 Additionally, in the correlation analysis only, each set of correlations were 
run a second time to control for ease of access to the constitutional court; to do 
so, the judicial review aggregate statistic was multiplied by the country’s 
Access score. This is done to account for the possibility that easier access to 
the courts yields not only an increase in case volume but also a decrease in the 
proportion of cases with strong legal merits.104 For example, for courts such as 
  
 103 Ibid. 426. 
 104 The aim of adjusting the dependent variable–the frequency of judicial review–for 
access to the courts is to control for the possibility that easier access permits not only more 
persons to petition the court, and thus presumably more cases, but also a higher proportion 
of cases with weak legal merits. The rationale for this expectation is complex, and can only 
be sketched briefly here: Assuming all parties are rational actors, if access to a court is 
suddenly opened to more parties and/or in more types of cases, the costs of petitioning the 
courts has effectively fallen (from infinity to a non-infinite level for those previously 
unable to petition the court at all; for some others, their ability to petition the court may 
have been indirect [as is common in CEE]–in that they could only request the ombudsman 
or an MP to petition the court on their behalf). Lower costs of petition, ceteris paribus, 
mean a fall in the cost-benefit ratio of petitioning the court–in short, a fall in the relative 
price of petitioning. That a fall in ‘price’ of petitioning should be met by an increase in the 
number of petitions, ceteris paribus, is not surprising. The important inference, though, is 
that presumably the group of ‘sub-marginal petitioners’–for whom it was not on balance 
worthwhile to petition the courts (due to the cost-benefit ratio) before access was made 
easier, but for whom ex post petitioning is worthwhile–would come to make petitions with 
a lower average likelihood of success (since cases more likely to succeed would already 
have a lower cost-benefit ratio). In short, it is most likely, on average, sub-marginal cases 
(in terms of legal merits and/or likelihood of success in securing judicial review) which are 
added to the courts’ docket when access is made easier. 
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Hungary’s where access is wide open to all,105 it makes sense that a smaller 
proportion of the 11,092 cases submitted in the court’s first six years covering 
nearly every statute the legislature had passed were actually of sufficient legal 
merit to warrant judicial review.106 Correcting for access controls for this 
possibility to some extent.  
 
 
4. Results & Analysis 
 
The results of bivariate correlations and selected regression analyses conducted 
(forty-eight regression models in total) are presented in Tables 4–16, reflecting 
of each layer of corrections and expansions upon the original Smithey–Ishiyama 
and Herron–Randazzo models.107 The following sections discuss the key findings 
from these analyses. 
 
4.1. Effects of Alternative Measures of Judicial Independence 
 
Table 4 presents bivariate correlations of various independent variables with 
three aggregate measures of judicial review. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report results 
of logit regressions testing the SII (original, arithmetically fixed, and data-corrected) 
against both pairs of authors’ original models.  
 The results concerning the influence of judicial independence on judicial 
review are indeed mixed, but a number of important are noteworthy. First, 
though the original SII is clearly a poor predictor of judicial review, substantive 
corrections in coding improve it noticeably. Correlations yield weak negative 
  
 105 Under the actio popularis, any individual can petition for abstract review of any 
statute without having been affected by the statute herself; See Hungarian Constitution and 
Act on the Constitutional Court, Act XXXII of 1989. 
 106 Sólyom–Brunner: op. cit. 72. 
 107 All 48 logit regressions run employ a weighting procedure, developed by Herron 
and Randazzo and also used by Smithey and Ishiyama, to ensure that countries which issue 
comparatively fewer decisions are not treated as less important by the regression analysis. 
A similar, slightly modified method of weighting cases was employed here. The full 
technical details of Herron and Randazzo’s weighting procedure are not detailed in their 
article, and were also not available on request; however, the procedure detailed above 
achieves the same purpose very similarly. In this study, the weight factor w given to each 
case decided by the court of country x is given by:  
(Total number of cases in the dataset)  
wx = ——————————————————————————————— 
 (Total number of cases from country x) * (Number of countries in dataset) 
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results, and no significant results were obtained by regression,108 even when 
technical and arithmetical errors are corrected. However, the data-corrected 
version of the SII reflects a small but important improvement in the SII’s 
predictive power: in correlation analysis it is positively correlated with judicial 
review (e.g. r = 0.297), a relation which is stronger when judicial review is 
adjusted for accessibility of the courts (r = 0.389 using original authors’ data 
plus Hungary and Poland; r = .263 using the new replication dataset). It also 
yields a positive, statistically significant relationship in one of four regressions 
where it is tested, and in all others yields no significant relationship. 
 Second, Smithey and Ishiyama’s casual observation that judicial review 
increases up to around the midpoint of the judicial independence scale before 
declining is confirmed. Tables 8 and 9 present results from models testing the 
‘peak’ observation, but otherwise still following the authors’ original template.  
 Using Smithey and Ishiyama’s own judicial review statistics, the correlation 
between judicial review and absolute value of the distance from 0.55 on the 
judicial independence SII is –0.668 and –0.907 for the original and data-corrected 
indices, respectively. This negative relationship is also found in regressions 
based on Smithey and Ishiyama’s (2002) models (where the relationship is 
statistically significant in every test), though not in those based on Herron and 
Randazzo’s models. 
 Although Smithey and Ishiyama do not offer an explanation for this, at least 
one possibility deserves mention.109 As both Vanberg110 and Stone Sweet111 
suggest, more powerful courts can influence policymaking without striking 
down statutes, or indeed without hearing a case, if the legislature (or other branch 
or body) anticipates that passing a bill which the court might unconstitutional 
will result in it being struck down by the court. In short, “the spectre of 
constitutional censure hovers over the legislative process.”112 This is true only 
to the extent that others anticipate court intervention and only to the extent that 
the court possesses the authority to do so. Thus, the degree of the court’s 
formal authority determines, as it were, the length of the shadow that the court 
casts over the legislature process. If this is true, it may in part explain the 
  
 108 In all statistical procedures the α value is .10, as used by Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 
 109 A second explanation may also account for this, which parallels the argument for 
adjusting the dependent variable for ease of access to the courts: the more powerful a court, 
the greater the demand for its services by individual appellants, and thus the greater its 
caseload and potentially the greater the proportion of cases with weak legal merit. 
 110 Vanberg: Legislative-judicial… op. cit.; Vanberg: Politics… op. cit. 
 111 Stone Sweet: Governing… op. cit. 
 112 Ibid. 196. 
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finding of the ‘peak’ in judicial review: the more power courts have, the less 
they need to exercise it, as statutes and other legal norms which they are likely 
to strike down are never passed in the first place.  
 Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13, report findings regarding new measures of judicial 
independence, tested in the framework of the prior authors’ original models. 
Variables measuring countries’ receptiveness to legal transplants are included 
in Tables 14 and 15. Finally, Table 16 presents three composite models which 
incorporate components from both the Smithey and Ishiyama or Herron and 
Randazzo template.  
 The new measures of the dimensions of judicial independence developed 
above do reflect some improvement over the SII, but the results are not 
consistent. On the one hand, the separate and combined measures of Power and 
Access (and the Composite power and access term) yield several positive, 
statistically significant relationships. On the other hand, both Insularity and its 
interactive term with Power (Power * Insularity) generate some positive and 
some negative statistically significant results. Moreover, no statistically 
significant relationships at all were evident in regressions based on Herron and 
Randazzo’s models.  
 Taken together, these findings thus warrant caution making generalizations 
about the relationships between judicial independence and judicial review. The 
central hypothesis, that judicial independence is positively associated with 
judicial review in CEE and the FSU, is confirmed in part and rejected in part. 
However, the alternative formulation of this hypothesis, that judicial power is 
positively related to judicial review (as the prior authors used the same SII to 
reflect both independence and power on different occasions), is confirmed. At 
the very least, the findings show that excluding independence from the judicial 
politics puzzle in transition countries is premature. Better conceptualisations 
and operationalisations are certainly needed, but writing judicial independence 
out of the equation in CEE and FSU would be mistaken. 
 
4.2. Effects of Other Replication Variables 
 
Although the prior authors differed in their expectations of the effect of 
legislative fragmentation, the replication findings here resolve that question. In 
all but two models in which it is included (35 of 37 regressions), legislative 
fragmentation (at the time of the decision) is positively related to judicial 
review, statistically significant at or below the .01 level. The primary hypothesis 
concerning legislative fragmentation is thus confirmed, affirming the hypotheses 
findings of Smithey and Ishiyama but rejecting the hypotheses of Herron and 
Randazzo. 
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 As noted earlier, however, Herron and Randazzo’s expectation may make 
sense if applied to fragmentation inside governing coalitions. This is supported 
by the evidence: party fragmentation is negatively associated with judicial 
review to a statistically significant degree in every model where it appears. 
This therefore confirms the secondary hypothesis regarding legislative fragmen-
tation inside coalitions (which neither previous work had tested). 
 Findings for presidential power clearly affirm the findings of Herron and 
Randazzo. In the overwhelming majority of models where it is included, 
presidential power is negatively associated with judicial review to a highly 
statistically significant degree. This makes intuitive sense for reasons described 
above: a powerful executive is in a better position to constrain the courts (by 
action or by explicit or implicit threat).  
 Findings for the degree of federalism, however, appear counterintuitive at 
first glance: in almost every regression, the number of elected sub-tiers of 
government is negatively correlated to judicial review, to a statistically sig-
nificant degree–directly contrary to Smithey and Ishiyama’s findings. While 
the negative and significant relationship is surprising, part of the problem may 
lie in the original authors confusing direct with indirect effects of federalism. 
While it is reasonable to expect a higher number of central, regional, and local 
layers of authority to generate jurisdictional conflicts yielding increased judicial 
involvement, it need not result in increased frequency of courts invalidating 
laws or official acts. 
 Smithey and Ishiyama’s finding concerning popular trust in the courts is 
also confirmed: in most models where it appears it is positively associated with 
judicial review, to a statistically significant degree. Those authors’ own index 
of written rights guarantees is also, in most models, positively and significantly 
related to judicial review.113 The measure used for rights guarantees by Herron 
and Randazzo, on the other hand, generated conflicting results: as higher degrees 
of civil liberties are reflected by lower scores on the index used, a negative 
relationship was expected, yet both positive and negative relationships appeared 
at statistically significant levels in different models. Herron and Randazzo them-
selves were likewise unable to find a clear-cut relationship. 
  
 113 Their data is taken from a variety of popular opinion surveys by the University of 
Strathclyde; however, direct access to this data was unavailable for replication, thus Smithey 
and Ishiyama’s reported figures had to be relied upon. Yet again, these figures exclude 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, as well as Georgia, warranting considerable caution (as the 
sample size is more than halved when these countries are excluded, and the represen-
tativeness of the panel is greatly reduced).  
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 The final attribute replicated here is the identity of the petitioner requesting 
that the court engage in judicial review in each case. Herron and Randazzo 
included the categories of individual citizens and the president, and the repli-
cation study coded these in addition to legislative petitioners (Herron and 
Randazzo also coded cases where the legislature was the respondent) and where 
the petition was made by a cabinet member or administrative officer, such as 
an ombudsman. Cases where the president or a cabinet or administrative official 
made the appeal were positively and significantly associated with judicial review 
in almost every model where they appeared. Additionally, where the categories 
of individual petitioner and legislative petitioner were related significantly to 
judicial review, the relationship was positive, confirming Herron and Randazzo’s 
hypotheses and affirming their findings. 
 
4.3. Effects of New Variables 
 
Replication also provided the opportunity to test additional causal factors 
influencing judicial review, namely those concerning the receptiveness of 
countries to legal transplantation. The present study set out five hypotheses, 
generally grounded in the existing literature on the ‘demand for law’, and the 
empirical data confirms all five. 
 First, it was hypothesised that in countries which showed a tendency for 
adapting the entire legal system (i.e. not just the constitutional court) which 
they had imported, the constitutional court the country imported would also 
function more ‘normally’ (i.e. resemble the model in the ‘exporting’ state more 
directly), meaning a higher level of judicial review than those which did not 
show a pattern of adaptation. Empirical findings clearly support this hypothesis: 
in all six regressions in which it is included, Adaptation114 shows a positive 
relationship to judicial review (statistically significant to at least the 0.01 level). 
It was also hypothesised that a country’s familiarity with the general legal 
system it imported during the transition period would be positive related to 
judicial review. The results here are less resounding, but they still confirm the 
expectation: statistically significant results appear in two of six regressions, and 
in both of these cases the relationship is positive.  
 In light of these first two, the results of testing the third hypothesis are 
therefore unsurprising. It was expected that receptiveness–meaning the presence 
of both adaptation and familiarity–would be positively related to judicial review. 
In both models where ‘receptiveness’ measured in this way is included, a 
highly statistically significant, positive relationship is evident.  
  
 114 Data from Pistor–Raiser–Gelfer: op. cit. 
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 The fourth hypothesis departed somewhat from the literature. It stated the 
expectation that countries which had no exposure at all to the “modern formal 
legal order”115 would also experience a higher level of judicial review. In each 
of eight models where it is included, the dummy variable for ‘new transplants’ is 
positive, and in seven of these the results are statistically significant, indicating 
that new transplants exhibit a higher level of judicial review than the reference 
category, ‘unreceptive’ transplants. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is also confirmed. 
 Finally, it was hypothesised that the greater the diversity of participation in 
the constitutional design and negotiation process, the greater the legitimacy 
of the court, and thus the greater the support for an active, powerful tribunal. 
Thus, more varied participation at the constitutional design stage (measured 
by legislatively fragmentation at the first democratic election116) should be 
associated with higher levels of judicial review. This hypothesis is confirmed 
by the fact that the only model which includes this measure of participation 
yields a positive, statistically significant relationship between participation (i.e. 
legislative fragmentation at first election) and judicial review. Notably, in the 
models testing these new independent variables of receptiveness, the most 
important attributes of political context detailed above (viz. presidential power, 
legislative fragmentation at most recent election) return the expected results 
(negative and positive, respectively). 
 
4.4. Effects of Control Variables 
 
While change in GDP growth was included in Herron and Randazzo’s model 
as a control variable, they make a number of arguments concerning its potential 
substantive import. For instance, following Tate and Vallinder,117 that in periods 
of poor or declining economic performance, “if citizens and corporations are 
dissatisfied with the ability of the political branches of government to 
efficiently regulate the economy, then they may turn to legal remedies in order 
to advance their own self-interests.”118 This argument is not totally implausible, 
but appears to explain increases or decreases in the public’s resorting to the 
courts, rather than judicial review. 
  
 115 Ibid. 15. 
 116 Complete and accurate data on the composition of various transition countries’ 
Round Table negotiations was not available, thus a proxy measure was necessary; note, 
however, that Smithey and Ishiyama use this same indicator to measure the same concept. 
Smithey–Ishiyama: Judicious choices... op. cit. 
 117 Tate–Vallinder: op. cit. 
 118 Herron–Randazzo: op. cit. 426. 
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 While access to the courts was included as a component of the new measures 
of judicial independence, it was also incorporated as a type of dependent-
variable control in a second set of bivariate correlations. The purpose was to 
account for the possibility that courts where the right to petition was widely 
diffused would as a result receive far more cases, a larger proportion of which 
would have lower legal merit and thus not warrant the exercise of judicial 
review.119 Adjusting the dependent variable (overall average of judicial review 
incidence) for access to the courts yielded much stronger correlations (e.g. r = 
0.389 vs. 0.147; r = 0.263 vs. 0.007) with the data-corrected SII than non-
adjusted measures. More strikingly, several dimensions of the new measures of 
judicial independence (Power; Composite power and access; Composite power 
and access * Insularity) switch from strong negative correlations (r = –0.547, 
–0.547, and –0.521, respectively) to strong positive correlations with judicial 
review (using original Smithey and Ishiyama data plus Hungary and Poland, 
r = 0.744, 0.815, and 0.800, respectively; using replication dataset, r = 0.851, 
0.972, and 0.943, respectively).120 Again, more rigorous and sophisticated 
methods of adjusting the dependent variable properly are still needed, but the 
elementary method employed here has yielded remarkable results.121 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
5. 1. Methodology 
 
As the foregoing study is designed partly to improve upon methodology and 
operationalisation of key variables, one of its most important findings is that 
the changes incorporated above to improve the execution, data-accuracy, and 
conceptualisation of judicial independence do make a difference. Technical and 
substantive corrections to the original SII both (1) yield small but still note-
worthy improvements in the predictive power of judicial independence and 
also (2) bring the findings more in line with Smithey and Ishiyama’s, Herron 
and Randazzo’s, and this study’s hypotheses.  
  
 119 See the Note to Table 4, supra. 
 120 While it may appear that the including measures of access in both of the variables 
correlated is unsound, the computation of the measure of access incorporated into the 
Composite measure renders it quite different (in algebraic form and in outcome) from the 
single scalar measure used to adjust judicial review figures.  
 121 For instance, various non-logit regression models were tested where the dependent 
variable (viz. decision outcome) was adjusted by access, but the resulting synthetic 
dependent variable was too highly leptokurtic to remain within regression assumptions. 
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 Moreover, the new, theoretically-grounded measures capturing several 
dimensions of judicial independence also mark a methodological advance. A 
number of statistically significant results, which are supported by the literature, 
indicate that the measures are at least a step in the right direction. Specifically, 
the new measures are designed to assess separately the different dimensions of 
judicial independence (before combining them via interactive terms), but which 
the prior measure does not.  
 
5.2. Substantive Findings  
 
Beyond these improvements in the study of judicial independence, the foregoing 
investigation yields a number of intriguing findings. The first hypothesis, 
that judicial independence positively correlates with judicial review, was 
partially confirmed and partially rejected. The Insularity dimension of judicial 
independence appears negatively related to judicial review, while the Power and 
Access of the court are both positively related. The second form of this hypo 
ethesis, that judicial power correlates with judicial review, is thus confirmed. 
Additionally, a central ‘peak’ does exist in the level of judicial review vis-à-vis 
the judicial independence distribution, for which there are several possible 
explanations.  
 Additionally, the study answers conclusively at least one question left in 
doubt by the prior research and sheds at least some light on others. Overall 
legislative fragmentation at the time a decision is issued by a court is positively 
related to judicial review in the transition states studied. Fragmentation within 
the governing coalition, however, is negatively related to judicial review. These 
findings support the replication study’s hypotheses, and make sense out of the 
disparate expectations and findings of Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and 
Ishiyama.  
 The study further confirms several secondary findings of the prior works: 
presidential power is negatively related to judicial review, while popular trust 
in the courts, extent of rights guarantees in the bill of rights, and popular trust 
in the courts are all positively associated with the frequency of judicial review. 
Likewise, cases where the president or an administration or cabinet official is 
the petitioner are more likely to result in the striking down of the law named in 
the petition.  
 Finally, the empirical data reveals relationships not studied in prior works. 
First, factors which affect the success of legal transplantations broadly speaking 
appear to influence the functionality of the newly imported constitutional 
courts. Second, the relative ease of access to courts has a significant, although 
complicated, effect on the frequency of judicial review. 
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 All of these findings, taken together, present a clearer and more complete 
picture of the contextual influences on judicial review than the prior works. 
Both the holistic portrait of the determinants of judicial review in transition 
and the new operationalisations of judicial independence offered here are merely 
first steps. While many scholars lament the dearth of theoretically sound, widely 
applicable conceptions and measures of judicial independence,122 for all its 
faults, Smithey and Ishiyama’s work represents one of the few which actually 
sets out to fill the gap.  
 More importantly, the integration of better conceptualisations of independence 
with measures of receptiveness represents an important step towards under-
standing how the process and conditions of transplanting constitutional 
adjudication institutions affects their development and behaviour. It is here in 
part where future research of constitutional jurisprudence in transition contexts 
must now focus. If it is true that the study of post-communist transition is 
rapidly becoming a matter of history,123 it is all the more important that the 
lessons taught by the experiences of constitutional judiciaries in CEE and the 
FSU be gleaned before the opportunity has vanished. 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
 
 
  
 122 Russell: op. cit.; Herron–Randazzo: op. cit.; Ramseyer–Rasmussen: op. cit. 
 123 Dupré: op. cit. 3ff. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1.   
Sample Comparisons–Prior Research vs. Replication Study 
 
 
 
 
 
Herron and Randazzo 
(2003) 
Smithey and Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Replication Study 
Country N Years N Years N Years 
Czech 
Republic 
11 1992–1996 10 1993–1995 61 1993–2003 
Estonia 42 1993–2000 19 1993–1995 58 1994–2003 
Georgia 11 1996–1997 11 1997–1999 17 1996–2003 
Hungary 0 n/a 0 n/a 118 1991–2003 
Latvia 0 n/a 13 1993–1995  n/a 
Lithuania 103 1993–2000 41 1993–1995 136 1993–2003 
Moldova 228 1995–2000 74 1995–1997 33 1998–2003 
Poland 0 n/a 0 n/a 250 1991–2003 
Russia 86 1995–1998 59 1995–1997 60 1995–2003 
Slovakia 0 n/a 96 1993–1995 47 1994–2003 
Slovenia 93 1993–1995 0 n/a 135 1992–2003 
TOTAL 574  323  915  
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 59 
  
Table 2a.   
Smithey and Ishiyama Index (SII) of Judicial Independence (2000): Original Index 
 
Country 
(A) 
Can 
judicial 
decision be  
overturned? 
 
(B) 
Presence 
of a priori 
review? 
(C) 
Judges 
term 
relative 
legislative 
session 
(D) 
No. of 
actors 
involved in 
selecting 
judges 
(E) 
Who 
establishes 
court 
procedures 
(F) 
Conditions 
for judicial 
removal 
Judicial 
power 
 score: 
A+B+C+
D+E+F/6 
 
Czech 
Republic 
1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.56 
Estonia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.39 
Georgia 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.56 
(0.39) † 
Hungary 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.58 
Lithuania 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.70 
Moldova 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 
Poland 
(1989–
1997/9) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poland 
(1997/9) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Russia 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.42 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.31 
Slovenia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.56 
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Table 2b.  
Smithey and Ishiyama Index (sii) of Judicial Independence (2000): Data-corrected Index 
 
Country 
(A)  
Can 
judicial 
decision 
be over- 
turned?1 
(B) 
 Presence 
of a priori 
review?2 
 
(C) 
 Judges 
term 
relative 
legislative 
session3 
(D) 
No. of 
actors 
invol- 
ved in 
selecting 
judges4 
(E)  
Who 
estab-
lishes 
court 
proce-
dures 
(F)  
Condi-
tions for 
judicial 
removal 
Judicial 
 power 
score: 
(A+B+ 
C+D+ 
E+F)/6 
 
 
Net  
Diffe-
rence 
Czech 
Republic 
1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.61 0.05 
Estonia 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.64 0.25 
Georgia 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 
–0.11  
(0.06)5 
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.13 
Lithuania 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.00 
Moldova 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.00 
Poland 
(1989–
97/9) 
0.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 
Poland 
(1997/9) 
1.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 
Russia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.05 
Slovenia 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.14 
 
 
 
 
 1 Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal gained the ability to issue binding decisions which 
the Sejm cannot override in the 1997 Constitution (which took effect in October 1997), and 
the provisions concerning binding decisions (not open to overruling by the Sejm) took 
effect in October 1999. Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) acknowledge this but ignore the 
change in computing Poland’s index score. 
 2 From the text of their respective constitutions and laws empowering their constitu-
tional courts, it is clear that the Supreme Court (Constitutional Chamber) in Estonia and the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary can each consider constitutional challenges prior to the 
final promulgation (and thus application) of legislative acts. Also, though Smithey and 
Ishiyama specifically consider the possibility that a court could have a priori jurisdiction in 
a narrow area of cases, such as the review of not-yet-ratified treaties, they do not count  
Russia nor Slovenia in this group, in contrast to the text of those courts’ respective 
empowering statutes. 
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Country: 
(A)  
Can 
judicial 
decision 
be over- 
turned?1 
(B) 
 Presence 
of a priori 
review?2 
 
(C) 
 Judges 
term 
relative 
legislative 
session3 
(D) 
No. of 
actors 
invol- 
ved in 
selecting 
judges4 
(E)  
Who 
estab-
lishes 
court 
proce-
dures 
(F)  
Condi-
tions for 
judicial 
removal 
Judicial 
 power 
score: 
(A+B+ 
C+D+ 
E+F)/6 
 
 
Net  
Diffe-
rence 
Poland 
(1989–
97/9) 
0.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 
Poland 
(1997/9) 
1.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 
Russia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.05 
Slovenia 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.14 
 
N.B.: Scores in bold underline indicate a change from the original Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) 
score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Smithey and Ishiyama (2000, 168) define the values of this variable as follows: the 
variable “was coded as 0 when the term of the constitutional court judge was less than or 
equal to one term of the actor with the longest constitutional term; 0.33 when it was less 
than or equal to two parliamentary sessions; 0.67 when the judges term was more than two 
parliamentary sessions (but had constitutionally specified limit in the number of terms) and 
1 when the term was life or until voluntary retirement”. However, the maximum term 
length of parliamentarians in all of these countries is four years, and the term lengths of 
judges are as follows: Czech Republic, 10 years; Georgia, 10 years; Poland, 9 years; 
Slovakia, 12 years; and Slovenia, 9 years. 
 4 In Estonia, the chairman of the Supreme Court is proposed by president, and adopted 
by national assembly; others are proposed by the chairman, and adopted by national 
assembly; the five members of constitutional panel elected by General Assembly of the 
Supreme Court. In Hungary, the court is chosen by a special committee of the (unicameral) 
parliament comprised of one member from each political party represented in parliament. 
In Poland, the panel of judges is chosen by the Sejm, but the President can appoint any of 
these to be the President and Vice-President, without the approval of the Sejm. Thus, for 
Estonia, a score of “1” seems more appropriate, and “.25” for Hungary and Poland.              
 5 In their original table, Smithey and Ishiyama report this total as .56, when data in 
their table yield a value of .39. 
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Table 3a. 
New Measures of Judicial Independence:  Elements of New Indices 
 
Power Average of binary scores for each of the following powers 
(1: court has this power; 0: court lacks this power): 
A priori Review of:  Constitution itself; International Agreements; 
Statutes; Regulations; Acts of the President; Acts of 
local/regional units; Other General Acts 
A posteriori abstract Review of:  Constitution; International Agreements; 
Statutes; Parliamentary Resolutions; Regulations; Acts of 
the President of the State; Local Government Statutes; 
General Acts–Exercise of Public Powers; Other General 
Acts; National Norms versus Treaties; Regional 
Agreements 
A posteriori concrete Review of constitutional complaints 
 Unconstitutional Omission Declare instance of unconstitutionality by omission (i.e. 
legislature has failed to act where it is obligated to do so) 
Access Average of binary scores for each of the following actors 
who have this right of access (1: this actor can invoke 
court for this power; 0: this actor cannot invoke court for 
this power): 
A priori Initiation by:  President; Parliamentary leadership/cabinet; 
Individual members of parliament; Second legislative 
chamber’s leadership; Individual members of second 
legislative chamber; Court itself; Other/lower courts; 
Administrative or legal official; Any citizen. 
A posteriori abstract Initiation by:  President; Parliamentary leadership/cabinet; 
Individual members of parliament; Second legislative 
chamber’s leadership; Individual members of second 
legislative chamber; Court itself; Other/lower courts; 
Administrative or legal official; Any citizen. 
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A posteriori concrete Initiation by:  Court itself; Lower court; 
Administrative/legal official; Local/regional government; 
Individuals with specific vested interest; Any individual 
citizen regardless of interest 
Unconstitutional Omission Initiation by:  Court itself; Any individual citizen 
regardless of interest 
Immunity Values:  0:  Judges have no special immunity;  0.5:  
Judges can be removed only with legislature’s consent; 
1.0:  Judges can be removed only with the Court’s own 
consent. 
Number of Effective Appointers = 1 / ∑ (ai
2)   Where ai is the proportion of control over 
Court appointments allotted to each actor i; same basic 
modification of Laakso-Taagepera (based on Herfindahl) 
formula for effective number of political parties.  N.B. 
where two parties share authority for the same 
appointment, the proportion they share is split between 
them (e.g. if Legislature and President each must confirm 
every appointee, they are each coded 0.50). 
Relative Term Length = T / L   Where T is the term length of a single judge in 
years and L is the length of a legislative session 
Control of Court’s Procedures Smithey and Ishiyama Index, component E; Values: Court 
sets own procedures = 1; Else = 0 
Removal Score Smithey and Ishiyama Index, component F; Values:  
Constitutional bar on removing judges = 1; Else 0 
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Table 3b. 
New Measures of Judicial Independence: Computation of New Indices 
 
New Indices of Dimensions of Judicial Independence 
Power = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) +  
a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4 
Access = [(a priori access) + (a posteriori abstract access) +  
(a posteriori concrete access) + (omission access)] / 4 
Insularity = [(Immunity score) + (number of effective appointers)/4 +  
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5 
Composite measure of power 
and access 
= [(a priori power)*(a priori access) + (a posteriori abstract 
power)* 
(a posteriori abstract access) + (a posteriori concrete 
power)*(a posteriori concrete access) + (omission 
power)*(omission access)] / 4 
Power * Access = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) + 
(a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4* [(a 
priori access) + (a posteriori abstract access) + (a posteriori 
concrete access) + (omission access)] / 4 
 Power * Insularity = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) + 
(a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4* 
[(Immunity score) + (number of effective appointers)/4 +  
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5 
Composite measure of power 
and access * Insularity 
= { [(a priori power)*(a priori access) + (a posteriori 
abstract power)* 
(a posteriori abstract access) + (a posteriori concrete 
power)*(a posteriori concrete access) + (omission 
power)*(omission access)] / 4 } * {[(Immunity score) + 
(number of effective appointers)/4 +  
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5} 
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 Table 4.   
Correlation Results (Modified Replication of Smithey and Ishiyama [2002])  
 
Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Variable Statistic 
Incidence  
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence of 
Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Judicial  
Independence 
                          
Smithey and 
Ishiyama Index 
                          
Pearson’s r –0.117   –0.276   –0.021   0.225   –0.024   0.181   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.802   0.549   0.957   0.561   0.947   0.618   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Original Index  
(fixed) 
r2 0.014   0.076   0.000   0.050   0.001   0.033   
Pearson’s r 0.297   –0.074   0.147   0.389   0.007   0.263   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.518   0.875   0.706   0.301   0.985   0.462   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Data-corrected 
Index 
r2 0.088   0.005   0.022   0.151   0.000   0.069   
Pearson’s r –0.421   –0.668   –0.147   –0.595 * –0.262   –0.418   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.347   0.101   0.706   0.091   0.465   0.229   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Original Index 
(fixed): Absolute 
Value of 
Distance from 
0.55  
r2 0.178   0.446   0.022   0.354   0.068   0.175   
Pearson’s r –0.655   –0.907 *** –0.441   –0.378   –0.457   –0.126   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.110   0.005   0.235   0.317   0.184   0.729   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Data-corrected 
Index (fixed) 
Absolute Value 
of Distance from 
0.55  
r2 0.429   0.822   0.194   0.143   0.209   0.016   
New Measures:                           
Pearson’s r –0.338   0.272   –0.547   0.744 ** –0.157   0.851 *** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.458   0.556   0.127   0.022   0.665   0.002   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Power measure 
r2 0.114   0.074   0.300   0.553   0.025   0.724   
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Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Variable Statistic 
Incidence  
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence of 
Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Pearson’s r –0.257   –0.437   –0.147   –0.107   –0.256   –0.063   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.578   0.326   0.705   0.785   0.475   0.863   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Insularity 
/Measure 
r2 0.066   0.191   0.022   0.011   0.066   0.004   
Pearson’s r –0.289   –0.064   –0.483   0.643 * –0.229   0.730 ** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.530   0.892   0.188   0.062   0.524   0.017   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Power * 
Insularity 
r2 0.083   0.004   0.233   0.413   0.053   0.533   
Pearson’s r –0.587   0.183   –0.547   0.815 *** 0.065   0.972 **** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.166   0.695   0.128   0.007   0.859   0.000   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Composite 
power and  
access measure 
r2 0.344   0.033   0.299   0.664   0.004   0.945   
Pearson’s r –0.522   0.009   –0.521   0.800 *** 0.024   0.943 **** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.229   0.985   0.150   0.010   0.948   0.000   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Composite  
power and  
access  
measure * 
Insularity 
r2 0.273   0.000   0.272   0.639   0.001   0.889   
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
                          
Pearson’s r 0.350   0.673 * 0.357   –0.126   0.045   –0.263   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.442   0.097   0.346   0.746   0.901   0.462   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
At first election 
r2 0.122   0.453   0.127   0.016   0.002   0.069   
Pearson’s r 0.068   0.559   0.155   0.101   0.363   –0.016   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.884   0.192   0.691   0.797   0.303   0.965   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Overall average 
r2 0.005   0.313   0.024   0.010   0.132   0.000   
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Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Variable Statistic 
Incidence  
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence of 
Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Incidence 
of Judicial 
Review 
Adjusted 
for Access 
Pearson’s r 0.620   0.084   0.620   0.084   0.364   –0.243   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.189   0.874   0.189   0.874   0.478   0.643   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Popular Trust in    
Courts 
r2 0.384   0.007   0.384   0.007   0.132   0.059   
Pearson’s r –0.577   0.178   –0.577   0.178   0.329   0.792   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.175   0.702   0.175   0.702   0.471   0.034   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Rights Index 
r2 0.333   0.032   0.333   0.032   0.108   0.627   
Pearson’s r 0.033   0.517   –0.170   0.228   –0.145   0.191   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.944   0.235   0.661   0.554   0.690   0.597   
N 7   7   9   9   10   10   
Federalism 
r2 0.001   0.267   0.029   0.052   0.021   0.036   
α = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001. 
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Table 6.    
Logit Results:  Factors Affecting Judicial Review 
(Modified Replication of Herron and Randazzo 2003) – Original & Corrected Indices 
 
Independent Variable Original Index 
Original Index 
(Calculations Fixed) 
Corrected Index 
(Coding Fixed) 
 B  (S.E.) Wald B (S.E.) Wald B (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial Independence       
Original S-I Index  –0.146 
   0.374 
0.151     
Index, Georgia 
Fixed 
   –0.123 
 (0.365) 
0.113   
Corrected S-I Index      –0.552 
(0.465) 
1.404 
Economic Conditions       
Change in GDP  
Growth (base 
 year = 1990) 
 –0.147*** 
(0.054) 
7.308  –0.147*** 
(0.054) 
7.309  –0.152*** 
(0.055) 
7.785 
Contextual Influences       
Presidential Power   –0.084**** 
(0.023) 
13.586 
 
  –0.084**** 
 (0.023) 
13.275   –0.092**** 
(0.024) 
14.949 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
   0.193**** 
(0.052) 
13.532    0.195**** 
 (0.051) 
14.307    0.186**** 
(0.051) 
13.477 
Civil Liberties    0.133 
(0.108) 
1.503    0.128 
  0.106) 
1.470    0.140 
(0.103) 
1.857 
Constant    0.390 
(0.337) 
1.000    0.380 
 (0.338) 
1.000    0.714 
 (0.434) 
1.000 
    
N 915 915 915 
    
–2LL 1162.729 1162.768 1161.465 
Model Chi Square 36.200 36.161 37.464 
Prob < Chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.053 0.053 0.055 
    
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.50% 63.90% 63.90% 
Reduction of Error 29.00% 27.80% 27.80% 
α = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001.   
DV:  Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
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Table 7.    
Logit Results:  Factors Affecting Judicial Review, continued 
(Modified Replication of Herron and Randazzo 2003) – Original & Corrected Indices 
 
Independent Variable 
Original Index Original Index 
(Calculations Fixed) 
Corrected Index 
(Coding Fixed) 
 B  (S.E.) Wald B (S.E.) Wald B (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial Independence       
Original S-I Index   0.012 
 (0.431 
0.001     
Index, Georgia 
Fixed 
   –0.168 
 (0.427) 
0.155   
Corrected S-I Index       –0.671 
 (0.551) 
1.482 
Economic Conditions       
Change in GDP 
Growth (base year 
= 1990) 
 –0.123** 
(0.061) 
4.020  –0.123** 
(0.061) 
4.042   –0.126** 
  (0.061) 
4.219 
Contextual Influences       
Presidential Power  –0.077*** 
(0.026) 
9.175 
 
  –0.081*** 
 (0.026) 
9.656   –0.088**** 
 (0.027) 
11.003 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
  0.262**** 
(0.063) 
17.375 
 
   0.257**** 
(0.061) 
17.517    0.249**** 
 (0.061) 
16.681 
Civil Liberties    0.099 
(0.124) 
0.644    0.113 
(0.121) 
0.871     0.118 
 (0.119) 
0.991 
Petitioner    
Individual  –0.188 
(0.187) 
1.013 
 
 –0.195 
(0.187) 
1.080   –0.209 
 (0.187) 
1.247 
President    1.247*** 
(0.437) 
8.162    1.236*** 
(0.436) 
8.035    1.218*** 
 (0.436) 
7.819 
Administration or 
Legal Official (e.g. 
Ombudsman) 
   0.616** 
(0.310) 
3.958    0.586* 
(0.309) 
3.600     0.541* 
 (0.307) 
3.110 
Members of 
Legislature 
   0.226 
(0.237) 
0.911    0.243 
(0.239) 
1.035     0.255 
  (0.238) 
1.156 
Constant  –0.133 
(0.397) 
1.113  –0.034 
(0.400) 
0.007     0.370 
  (0.520) 
0.506 
N 764 764 764 
–2LL 962.366 963.708 962.366 
Model Chi Square 53.944 54.099 55.441 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.093 0.093 0.095 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.90% 64.40% 63.90% 
Reduction of Error 29.80% 28.80% 27.80% 
 
α = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001.   
DV:  Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down).   
N.B. Smaller sample size results from missing data on petitioners in some cases in the dataset.  Weights 
have been adjusted. 
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Table 8.    
Logit Results:  Effect of Distance from ‘Peak’ of Judicial Power on Judicial Review 
(Following Smithey and Ishiyama’s [2002] Models) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Distance from Peak 
Distance from Peak,  
Controlling for 
Access 
Distance from Peak 
Distance from Peak, 
Controlling for 
Access 
Independent 
Variable 
B (S.E.) Wald    B (S.E.)  Wald B (S.E.) Wald B (S.E.) Wald 
Distance from 
‘peak’ of Judicial 
Independence 
–3.402 
(1.945) 
* 3.059  –3.632 
(1.971) 
* 3.395  –3.524 
(1.869) 
* 3.555  –3.740 
(1.887) 
** 3.927 
Accessibility of 
Courts 
    –2.116 
(2.321) 
 0.831      –2.362 
(2.209) 
 1.143 
Number of Sub-
tiers 
–0.968 
(0.259) 
**** 14.010  –0.955 
(0.259) 
**** 13.589  –0.281 
(0.206) 
 1.855  –0.282 
(0.206) 
 1.875 
Rights Index 5.896 
(3.070) 
* 3.689  4.935 
(3.260) 
 2.291  12.478 
(3.732) 
**** 11.177  10.902 
(4.017) 
*** 7.366 
Popular Trust in 
Courts 
        0.034 
(0.010) 
**** 11.582  
 
0.032 
(0.010) 
*** 9.704 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
0.425 
(0.099) 
**** 18.363  0.411 
(0.100) 
**** 16.803         
Constant 0.155 
(0.444) 
 0.121  0.572 
(0.639) 
 0.801  –0.629 
(0.604) 
 1.084  –0.095 
(0.787) 
 0.014 
N  414 414 397 397 
–2LL 500.192 499.366 476.488 475.350 
Model Chi Square 27.817 28.644 26.479 17.617 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Pseudo R square 0.080 0.080 0.057 0.061 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 69.50% 69.50% 68.70% 68.70% 
Reduction of Error 39.00% 39.00% 37.40% 37.40% 
α = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001 
DV:  Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
N.B.:  Smaller sample sizes(414 and 397, respectively)  result from unavailability of data for Smithey and 
Ishiyama’s Hungary, Poland, or Slovenia, and in the case of Model 2, popular trust score for Georgia. 
 
 
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 73 
  
Table 9.   
Logit Results:  Effect of Distance from ‘Peak’ of Judicial Power on 
Judicial Review (Following Herron and Randazzo’s [2003] Models)  
 
Without Controlling for Petitioner  Controlling for Petitioner 
 
B (S.E.)   Wald B (S.E.) Wald 
0.352  0.427  –0.217  0.122 Distance from ‘peak’ of Judicial 
Independence (0.539)    (0.621)   
Contextual Influences        
 Legislative Fragmentation 
0.202 
(0.050) 
**** 16.064  0.260 
(0.061) 
**** 18.176 
 Presidential Power 
0.144 
(0.109) 
 1.750  0.085 
(0.124) 
 0.473 
 Civil Liberties 
–0.090 
(0.025) 
**** 12.496  –0.073 
(0.028) 
*** 6.639 
Economic Conditions        
 
Change in GDP Growth 
(base year = 1990) 
–0.148 
(0.054) 
*** 7.422  –0.123 
(0.061) 
** 3.979 
Petitioner        
 Individual     –0.195  1.082 
      (0.188)   
 President     1.254 *** 8.255 
      (0.436)   
 Administration or Legal 
Official 
    0.639 
(0.310) 
** 4.245 
 Members of Legislature     0.225  0.913 
      (0.235)   
Constant 0.251  0.776  –0.090  0.071 
  (0.285)    (0.340)   
N                    915 ___                    764 ___ 
–2LL 1162.453  963.742 
Model Chi Square 36.477  54.065 
Prob < Chi square 0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.054  0.093 
Null Model 50.00%  50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.50%  65.00% 
Reduction of Error 29.00%  30.00% 
α = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001.   
DV:  Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down). 
N.B. Smaller sample size results from missing data on petitioners in some cases in the dataset.  Weights 
have been adjusted. 
74 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
 
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 75 
  
76 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 77 
  
     
78 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
 
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 79 
  
      
80 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
 
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 81 
  
 
82 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
 
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 83 
  
   
84 JONATHAN C. BOND  
  
Table 15.   
Influence of Legal “Transplant Effect” on Judicial Review (Panel B) 
 
6 7 8 Independent 
Variable B(S.E.)  Wald B(S.E.) Wald B(S.E.) Wald 
Judicial 
Independence 
         
   Power measure 21.457 *** 6.879 19.035 ** 5.291    
 (8.181)   (8.276)      
   Insularity measure 7.220 *** 8.311 9.419 **** 11.829    
 (2.505)   (2.739)      
   Power * Insularity –36.925 *** 7.861 –40.481 *** 9.176    
 (13.170)   (13.364)      
   Access measure –1.430  0.889 0.966  0.252    
 (1.516)   (1.926)      
Presidential Power –0.066 * 3.731 –0.082 ** 5.181    
 (0.034)   (0.036)      
Legislative 
Fragmentation           
At time of decision 0.163 *** 7.553 0.225 *** 10.342    
 (0.059)   (0.070)      
At time of first 
election 
      0.126 
(0.051) 
** 6.120 
Civil Liberties –0.074  0.135 0.035  0.026    
 (0.203)   (0.215)      
Federalism 
 
      –0.242 
(0.154) 
 2.471 
Adaptation    1.333 
(0.315) 
**** 17.852 0.902 
(0.214) 
**** 17.770 
 
Familiarity    0.283 
(0.558 
 0.257 0.625 
(0.327) 
* 3.647 
Receptive Transplant 1.216 
(0.311) 
**** 15.245       
New Transplant 0.868 
(0.352) 
** 6.074 1.468 
(0.640) 
** 5.255 1.090 
(0.336) 
*** 10.548 
Constant –3.738 
(1.391) 
*** 7.226 –5.633 
(1.612) 
****  –0.770 
(0.435) 
* 3.128 
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N  915 915 915
–2LL 1149.981 1145.895 1177.614 
Model Chi Square 48.949 53.034 25.948 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.071 0.077 0.038 
  
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.72% 63.46% 61.80% 
Reduction of Error 29.44% 26.92% 23.60% 
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Table 16.   
Selected Composite Models of Factors Affecting Judicial Review  
 
1 2 3 
Independent Variable 
B(S.E.)  Wald B(S.E.) Wald B(S.E.) Wald 
Change in GDP Growth 
(1990 = base year) 
–0.118 
(0.056) 
** 4.403 –0.098 
(0.055) 
* 3.222 –0.105 
(0.057) 
 3.319 
 
 
Presidential Power –0.257 **** 20.430 –0.273 **** 24.448 –0.353 **** 11.374  
 (0.057)   (0.055)   (0.105)    
Civil Lliberties 0.436 *** 6.652 0.368 **  5.318 0.641 *** 7.037  
 (0.169)   (0.160)   (0.242)    
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
          
At time of decision 0.173  2.309    0.198 * 2.786  
 (0.114)      (0.118)    
Inside Coalition –0.693 **** 12.827 –0.628 **** 11.318 –0.602 *** 7.177  
 (0.193)   (0.187)   (0.225)    
Federalism 0.556 *** 7.385 0.540 *** 7.186 1.332 ** 4.103  
 (0.205)   (0.201)   (0.658)    
Judicial Independence           
Composite power and 
access measure * 
Insularity 
–4.256 
(1.669) 
** 6.499 –4.774 
(1.624) 
*** 8.644     
 
Power * Insularity     
 
  –8.002 
(7.557) 
 1.121  
Power * Access       0.026 
(3.192) 
 0.000  
Insularity       4.164 
(3.518) 
 1.401  
Constant 3.061 
(0.991) 
*** 9.543 3.838 
(0.846) 
**** 20.574 0.161 
(2.457) 
 0.004  
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N  915 915 915  
–2LL 913.872 916.371 912.546 
Model Chi Square 39.603 37.103 40.929 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.072 0.068 0.075 
  
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 66.50% 64.60% 66.20% 
Reduction of Error 33.00% 29.20% 32.40% 
 
 
